But Ray's most destructive shortcoming as a CEO was his failure to create a cohesive, cooperative management team. His style was such that he set executive against executive, created rivalry for personal promotion and company resources, and in general created a highly politicized environment at Novell. Many employees feel this political maneuvering engendered by Ray sapped morale, undermined productivity, and wasted both money and talent.
Politics were always present at Novell -- what company is free of conflict and partisan activity? Or would seek to be: For conflict is desirable as long as the outcome is constructive. Yet at certain points in Novell's history, political conflict became so intense that work stopped and initiative was paralyzed.
Until Ray started acquiring other companies in late 1985 and 1986, his management team was relatively stable and cooperative. Such conflicts that occurred had led to positive results. But as the company grew and more outsiders were introduced, the political game became ugly and desperate, leading to resignations, lay-offs, and bad feelings among those who were forced out and those who survived. Between 1985 and 1990, Ray went through 32 vice presidents.
Ray's style that so politicized the company was his habit of meeting one-on-one with his executives to discuss situations and make decisions. These decisions were then presented as faits accompli to the rest of the management team at weekly staff meetings. In the early years, the staff was small enough that Ray's style was annoying but not destructive, and staff meetings were held pretty regularly. In the period from 1986 to 1988, the press of business was such that the weekly staff meetings often fell by the wayside and were held only sporadically. Politically maneuvering increased during this period.
One-on-one decision-making led executives to compete for Ray's attention, and many of his direct reports felt the last person to "get to Ray" was the person whose agenda would prevail. In this situation, people cease to cooperate in a search for the right decision but rather seek to curry favor personally with the boss. Debate is replaced by sycophantism. Innovators are replaced by yes men. Talented contributors are replaced by poseurs.
An interesting question is whether Ray deliberately set his managers against each other or whether he unintentionally allowed politics to flourish as he focused on the sales end of his business. Opinion is divided among executives who reported to him. The answer probably lies somewhere in between: As a man in a hurry, he intervened wherever he thought he was most needed. He micromanaged the critical functions and refrained from managing less critical areas. To some executives he gave, through default, absolute power over their domains, even where it may have been unwise to do so. If they messed up, he got rid of them.
Was this sturm and drang necessary? Was this turmoil an inevitable result of growth through acquisition, or might it have been handled better? Whatever the answer, it hardly matters. Politics at Novell, and such damage and waste they caused, have been completely overshadowed by the company's stupendous success.
Catching Ray15 Proven Ways to Catch Ray Noorda, By his secretary [NN, Jan/Feb 86, pp 18-19]
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Ray's Maxims[FROM Novell Network, Oct 86, p.2] On the small document are 12 maximums [sic] Noorda has carried in his wallet for 15 years. They are:
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